ISLAMABAD, Pakistan — less than a month after President Obama assured testily journalists in 2009 that Pakistan's nuclear materials "remains of the militant hands," his Ambassador here sent a secret message to Washington suggest that she remained deeply concerned.
The Ambassador concern was a stockpile of highly enriched uranium, sit in years near the aging research nuclear reactor in Pakistan. There were enough to build multiple "dirty bombs" or in the qualified hands, possibly enough for an actual atomic bomb.
Cable, dated May 27, 2009, reported the Ambassador, Anne w. Patterson, the Pakistani Government once again was dragging its feet on an agreement concluded for two years previously United States remove the material.
She wrote to the senior US officials that the Pakistani Government had concluded that "the ' sensational ' international and local media coverage of Pakistan's nuclear weapons made it impossible to continue at this time." A senior Pakistani official said she warned, if the word is leaked that the Americans will help remove the fuel, the local press would probably "to describe it as the United States." take Pakistan's nuclear weapons
Fuel is still there.
It may be the most unnerving proof of complex relationship — sometimes co-operative, often confrontational, always cautious — between the United States and Pakistan, almost ten years to the US-led war in Afghanistan.Cables, produced by WikiLeaks and made available for a number of news organizations make it clear that lie underneath public insurances deep clash over strategic objectives on issues such as Pakistan's support for Afghan Taliban and tolerance of al-Qaeda and Washington's warmer relations with India, Pakistan's Archenemy.
Written from the u.s. Embassy in Islamabad, reveals the cables American diplomats maneuver which try to support an unpopular elected Government that is more responsive to the American targets than is the real power in Pakistan, the army and the Intelligence Agency so crucial to the struggle against militant.Cables show how weak the civil government are: President Asif Ali Zardari told Vice President Joseph r. Biden Jr. that he worried that the military might "take me."
Frustration over American lack of ability to persuade the Agency's Pakistani army and the intelligence to cease to support the Afghan Taliban and other militant runs through the reports of the meetings between the American and Pakistani officials.
That frustration busy the Bush administration and became a problem for the incoming Obama administration, cables, document, during a trip in January 2009, Mr. Biden has carried out Pakistan 11 days before he was sworn in. in a meeting with General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, Army Chief of staff, Mr. Biden asked several times about Pakistan and the United States "had the same enemy as we further."
"The United States need to be able to make an objective assessment of Pakistan's part of the deal," said Mr. Biden, according to a Feb. 6, 2009, cable.
General Kayani tried to reassure him said, "we are on the same page in Afghanistan, but there can be different tactics."Mr. Biden replied that "results" would tester.
The cables reveals at least one example of increased cooperation, previously undisclosed under the Obama administration.Last autumn, allowed the Pakistani army secretly 12 American Special Operations soldiers to deploy with Pakistani troops in the violent Tribal areas near the Afghan border.
The Americans were prohibited to lead combat missions.Even though their number was small, had their presence in the army headquarters in Bajaur, South Waziristan and North Waziristan, a "sea change in the way of thinking," the Embassy reported.
The Embassy added its normal prudence: implementations must be kept secret or "Pakistani military will probably stop making requests for assistance."
In recent years, however, Pakistan and the United States began to publicly acknowledge the role of a very American field advisors. Lieutenant Colonel Michael Shavers, a u.s. military spokesman in Islamabad, said in a statement that "at the request of the Pakistanis," small teams of Special Operations forces, "move to different locations with their Pakistani military counterparts throughout Pakistan."
In addition, the last week in a report to Congress on operations in Afghanistan, the Pentagon said that the Pakistani army also had accepted American and coalition advisors in Quetta.
The cables do not address the sharp increase in Mr. Obama in the drone attacks against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban in the Tribal areas of Pakistan's tacit approval. This is because the cables is not classified at the highest level.
A deep scepticism
Of all the visible manifestations of the cables, however, deep scepticism that Pakistan will ever fully cooperate to fight the full range of extremist groups. [citation needed] this is partly because Pakistan sees some of the strongest militant groups such as insurance for the inevitable day United States military to withdraw from Afghanistan and Pakistan — want to exert maximum influence inside Afghanistan and against Indian intervention.
In fact, Consul General in Peshawar wrote in 2008 that she believed that some members of the Haqqani network — one of the most deadly groups attacking American and Afghan soldiers — had left the North Waziristan to escape the drone strikes. Some members of the family, wrote she moved to the South of Peshawar; other fine in Rawalpindi, where senior Pakistani military officials also live.
Jane Perlez reported from Islamabad, and David e. Sanger and Eric Schmitt from Washington. William j. broad and Andrew w. Lehren contributed reporting from New York.
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